

Irregular Warfare The Future Military Strategy For Small States

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The Filipino Way of War
Fernando M. Reyeg 2011
The Filipino Way of War
is the dominant
irregular warfare

strategy executed by the
Filipino warrior
throughout the
centuries. Armed with
severely limited
resources, a strong

fighting spirit, and deep traditions, the Filipino warrior has always had to look for another method of warfare other than direct and total war. This has led to the indirect path, the path of irregular warfare. This tradition, built upon a foundation of tribal warfare, shaped by resistance to Spanish and American colonization, and honed during the guerrilla campaign against the Japanese occupation, has emerged in the modern era as the predominant Filipino military strategy. Entering the 21st century, conflict in the Philippines has not been focused on external invaders, but on internal division. In this era, both government and anti-government forces have recalled their traditions and experiences and

predominantly used irregular warfare strategies, often through unconventional warfare, insurgency, or special operations. As external military influences wane, it is important to understand and prepare the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the future by understanding their past history, so that the Filipino warrior will be better prepared for tomorrow. Understanding Modern Warfare David Jordan 2016-07-14 Understanding Modern Warfare has established itself as the leading introduction to the issues, ideas, concepts and context necessary to understand the theory and conduct of warfare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It is an invaluable text for military professionals and students of military history. Key features

include: incisive coverage of the debates surrounding contemporary and future warfare; accessible, yet sophisticated, discussion across the land, sea, and air environments; and coverage of contemporary topics such as drones, cyber warfare, and hybrid warfare. The book makes extensive use of text boxes to explain key concepts and to reference extended examples, and it includes annotated guides to further reading and key questions to promote the reader's further thinking. This second edition has been fully revised and updated to take into account new debates and recent events in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine, and it has also been restructured to further improve its usefulness as a teaching tool.

The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency M.L.R. Smith 2015-05-19 The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency—a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about

COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization.

Another Bloody Century

Colin S. Gray 2012-02-23

How the wars of the near future will be fought and who will win them
Many nations, peoples and special interest groups believe that

violence will advance their cause. Warfare has changed greatly since the Second World War; it continued to change during the late 20th century and this process is still accelerating.

Political, technological, social and religious forces are shaping the future of warfare, but most western armed forces have yet to evolve significantly from the cold war era when they trained to resist a conventional invasion by the Warsaw Pact. America is now the only superpower, but its dominance is threatened by internal and external factors. The world's most hi-tech weaponry seems helpless in the face of determined guerrilla fighters not afraid to die for their beliefs. Professor Colin Gray has advised governments on both sides of the Atlantic

and in ANOTHER BLOODY CENTURY, he reveals what sort of conflicts will affect our world in the years to come.

Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime Max G.

Manwaring 2014-10-22 New insights for understanding and combating Al Qaeda and other contemporary security threats Wars were once fought mainly between nations—a presumption put to rest on September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda showed that nonstate actors could threaten a traditional nation-state and pursue strategic objectives without conventional weaponry, thereby altering the nature of war and often rendering military firepower meaningless. National security expert Max G. Manwaring examines the emergence of nonstate actors in a geopolitical world. Manwaring invites policy makers to look

past familiar insurgencies such as those in Vietnam and Iraq and consider global security problems from multiple perspectives. He concludes that the use of calculated political and psychological power may be the most effective response in many situations. The power to make war no longer rests solely in the hands of traditional governments. Manwaring analyzes the context, conduct, and outcome of today's irregular wars and applies proven methods of effective response to seven case studies: Colombia, Al Qaeda, Portugal, Uruguay, Venezuela, Italy, and Central American gangs and criminal organizations. *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime* translates the cogent lessons of recent events into workable strategies for

tomorrow's leaders. This book is required reading for students of national security policy and foreign-policy analysis.

Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? Colin S. Gray 2012

The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare Stephen D. Biddle 2008 Hezbollah's conduct of its 2006 campaign in southern Lebanon has become an increasingly important case for the U.S. defense debate. Some see the future of warfare as one of nonstate opponents employing irregular methods, and advocate a sweeping transformation of the U.S. military to meet such threats. Others point to the 2006 campaign as an example of a nonstate actor nevertheless waging a state-like conventional war, and argue that a

more traditional U.S. military posture is needed to deal with such enemies in the future. This monograph seeks to inform this debate by examining in detail Hezbollah's conduct of the 2006 campaign. The authors use evidence collected from a series of 36 primary source interviews with Israeli participants in the fighting who were in a position to observe Hezbollah's actual behavior in the field in 2006, coupled with deductive inference from observable Hezbollah behavior in the field to findings for their larger strategic intent for the campaign.

Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth Andrew Mumford 2011 The British "way" of counterinsurgency warfighting has often been held up by academics and military practitioners alike as a

model worthy of replication by other national militaries, including the United States. In this insightful and provocative monograph, Dr. Andrew Mumford posits that the popular perception of British counterinsurgency efficacy from Malaya onwards has certainly not been supported by the historical record of consistent tactical errors in the early phases of campaigns and long-term strategic obfuscation. Mumford takes the body of experience accumulated by the British in the past 60 years and uses it as a rich empirical base from which to rethink issues of immense strategic salience, such as the state of counterinsurgency education in the British military system; the utility of a "hearts and

minds" strategy; and the nature of coalition-based irregular warfare. Slug-gish British military lesson-learning, as seen through Mumford's "10 myths of British counterinsurgency," provides today's strategists the opportunity to understand the value of lesson transferral and the problems of strategic inertia. From the standpoint of the questionable British performance in Iraq, this monograph fundamentally assesses the arguable myth that surrounds British competency at counterinsurgency warfare, hopefully sparking a debate about the "mythology" of recent British counterinsurgency warfighting. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare
Nicholas J. Schlosser

2015 U.S. Marines in Irregular Warfare: Training and Education is a brief history that recounts how the U.S. Marine Corps adapted to fight the Global War on Terrorism during 2000-10. The Marine Corps has a long history of fighting irregular wars, including the Banana Wars in Central America during the 1920s and the Vietnam War during the 1960s. To battle the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Corps drew upon this experience while also implementing new plans and programs to better prepare Marines to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The Marine Corps updated the curriculum at the Command and Staff College and transformed the annual Combined Arms Exercise into Exercise Mojave Viper: an immersive training program that simulated

the urban environments in which Marines would be operating in Southwest Asia. Most importantly, Marines adjusted in the field, as battalion and company commanders drew on their basic training and education to devise innovative tactics to better combat the new threats they now faced. Thus, as this story shows, the Marine Corps did not undergo a radical transformation to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead drew on principles that had defined it as a warfighting organization throughout most of its history. Keywords: United States Marine Corps; United States Marines; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Marines; Marines; Marine Corps; Global War on Terrorism; global war on terrorism; irregular warfare; military strategy; counterinsurgency;

combat; Iraq War; Iraq War; Afghanistan; military education; soldier training; combat training and tactics; Southwest Asia

Irregular Warfare Arnold Milton 2012 At present, America's enemies are of an irregular character. These irregular enemies necessarily wage war in modes that are largely unconventional. Joint operations concepts describe how the joint force is expected to conduct joint operations within a military campaign in the future. They identify the broad military capabilities necessary to achieve the ends envisioned by the concept. Since the original version of the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept was approved in September 2007, the understanding of irregular warfare has continued to evolve. This book explores how the joint forces must

operate to counter irregular threats and to guide force development, material and non-material capability development, and experimentation when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to prevent, deter, disrupt and defeat non-state actors, as well as state actors who pose irregular threats.

Hybrid Warfare Mikael Weissmann 2021 Hybrid Warfare refers to a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, so-called 'irregular warfare' and cyber-attacks with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy and foreign political intervention. As Hybrid Warfare becomes increasingly commonplace, there is an imminent need for research bringing attention to how these challenges can be

addressed in order to develop a comprehensive approach towards Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare. This volume supports the development of such an approach by bringing together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on the topic and by covering the threats themselves, as well as the tools and means to counter them, together with a number of real-world case studies. The book covers numerous aspects of current Hybrid Warfare discourses including a discussion of the perspectives of key western actors such as NATO, the US and the EU; an analysis of Russia and China's Hybrid Warfare capabilities; and the growing threat of cyberwarfare. A range of global case studies ? featuring specific examples from the Baltics, Taiwan,

Ukraine, Iran and Catalonia ? are drawn upon to demonstrate the employment of Hybrid Warfare tactics and how they have been countered in practice. Finally, the editors propose a new method through which to understand the dynamics of Hybrid Threats, Warfare and their countermeasures, termed the 'Hybridity Blizzard Model'. With a focus on practitioner insight and practicable International Relations theory, this volume is an essential guide to identifying, analysing and countering Hybrid Threats and Warfare.

Strategic Studies Thomas G. Mahnken 2014-01-10
The second edition of *Strategic Studies: A Reader* brings together key essays on strategic theory by some of the leading contributors to the field. This revised volume contains several new essays and updated

introductions to each section. The volume comprises hard-to-find classics in the field as well as the latest scholarship. The aim is to provide students with a wide-ranging survey of the key issues in strategic studies, and to provide an introduction to the main ideas and themes in the field. The book contains six extensive sections, each of which is prefaced by a short introductory essay: The Uses of Strategic Theory Interpretation of the Classics Instruments of War, Intelligence and Deception Nuclear Strategy Irregular Warfare and Small Wars Future Warfare, Future Strategy Overall, this volume strikes a balance between theoretical works, which seek to discover generalisations about the nature of modern strategy, and case studies, which

attempt to ground the study of strategy in the realities of modern war. This new edition will be essential reading for all students of strategic studies, security studies, military history and war studies, as well as for professional military college students. The Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare: The Need for Strategy Colin S. Gray 2012 Relational Maneuver U S Military 2019-04-08 This is an extremely impressive and comprehensive late 2018 report. Based on historical lessons learned from irregular warfare case studies, and internal organizational analysis, this thesis seeks to provide Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) with specific implementable recommendations based on Edward Luttwak's concept

of relational maneuver. Luttwak defines relational maneuver as a style of warfare that requires a deep understanding of the threat and its operational environment to identify vulnerabilities, adapt, and exploit those weaknesses to destroy the enemy as a system. Luttwak argues that irregular warfare requires effective implementation of relational maneuver to achieve operational and strategic success. The U.S. military's experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2009 through 2016 have revealed insufficient use of relational maneuver, favoring, instead, employment of attrition warfare, which focuses on optimizing internal organizational efficiency without understanding, or adapting to, the threat

or the operational environment. Through this research, the authors seek to influence MARSOC's organizational strategy to more effectively wage irregular warfare. The final recommendations provide a possible path to MARSOC for overcoming institutional challenges inhibiting the employment of relational maneuver in irregular warfare.

I. Introduction
* II. Relational Maneuver: An Analytical Framework
* III. Case Study: Vietnam, An Ineffective Evolution Toward Relational Maneuver
* IV. El Salvador: "Not A Military War"
* V. Afghanistan: "Still A Question Mark"
* VI. SOF Advantages-Introduction
* VII. Organizational Design and MARSOC
* VIII. Synthesis, Analysis, And Recommendations
* IX. Discoveries,

Disclaimers, and Further Research * 2019 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment

The evidence suggests that the root of the U.S. military's strategic failures in irregular warfare lies in ineffective implementation of what modern strategist Edward Luttwak defines as relational maneuver. Relational maneuver is a style of warfare that focuses on studying a threat to identify and exploit vulnerabilities to achieve strategic success. This style of warfare requires a deep understanding of the threat and operational environment and the adaptation to exploit threat vulnerabilities. In irregular warfare, adaptation and exploitation must occur through both political and traditional military competition. The U.S. military, including SOF,

disproportionally applies maneuver through traditional military violence rather than political competition. This study draws upon the strategic context outlined by the 2018 NDS, the projected prevalence of future irregular warfare, credible research on irregular warfare, historical U.S. military lessons, and internal organizational analysis to produce implementable recommendations to the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC). These recommendations are intended to enhance MARSOC's ability to wage irregular warfare and influence successful strategic outcomes in line with the 2018 NDS. Three intermediate arguments underpin the final recommendations. First, irregular warfare is fundamentally more complex, dynamic, and

uncertain than doctrinally defined traditional warfare due to political competition that occurs at every level of warfare. Second, U.S. military strategic success in irregular warfare requires applying relational maneuver, which enables the necessary understanding and adaptation to identify and exploit threat vulnerabilities in uncertain operational environments. Third, SOF and MARSOC need to better apply relational maneuver through both political competition and military violence.

Modern Military Strategy
Elinor C. Sloan
2016-10-11 This textbook provides a comprehensive introduction to post-Cold War military theory for students of strategic studies. This second edition has been fully revised and updated, including a new

chapter on peacekeeping, and examines contemporary strategic thought on the conduct of war in the sea, land, air, nuclear, space and cyber domains, as well as irregular warfare. Each chapter identifies contemporary strategic thinkers in a particular area, examines strategic thought through the lens of identifiable themes, and discusses the ideas of classical strategists to provide historical context. Examples of the link between the use of military force and the pursuit of political objectives are presented, such as airpower against ISIS and in Libya, counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-piracy operations off the coast of Africa, and the Stuxnet virus in Iran. The chapters identify trends, statements and principles that indicate

how military power can best be employed to effect political ends, while the conclusion paints an overall picture of the relationship between classic and contemporary strategic thinking within each warfare domain. This book will be essential reading for students of strategic studies, war studies and military history, and is highly recommended for students of security studies and international relations in general.

Afghan Endgames Hy Rothstein 2012-01-06 The United States and its allies have been fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for a decade in a war that either side could still win. While a gradual drawdown has begun, significant numbers of US combat troops will remain in Afghanistan until at

least 2014, perhaps longer, depending on the situation on the ground and the outcome of the US presidential election in 2012. Given the realities of the Taliban's persistence and the desire of US policymakers—and the public—to find a way out, what can and should be the goals of the US and its allies in Afghanistan? *Afghan Endgames* brings together some of the finest minds in the fields of history, strategy, anthropology, ethics, and mass communications to provide a clear, balanced, and comprehensive assessment of the alternatives for restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Presenting a range of options—from immediate withdrawal of all coalition forces to the maintenance of an open-ended, but greatly reduced military

presence—the contributors weigh the many costs, risks, and benefits of each alternative. This important book boldly pursues several strands of thought suggesting that a strong, legitimate central government is far from likely to emerge in Kabul; that fewer coalition forces, used in creative ways, may have better effects on the ground than a larger, more conventional presence; and that, even though Pakistan should not be pushed too hard, so as to avoid sparking social chaos there, Afghanistan's other neighbors can and should be encouraged to become more actively involved. The volume's editors conclude that while there may never be complete peace in Afghanistan, a self-sustaining security

system able to restore order swiftly in the wake of violence is attainable.

A Risk-based Approach to Strategic Balance

John A. Mauk 2010 Current Secretary of Defense guidance to the armed services is to develop a strategically balanced Joint force capable of spanning the full spectrum of conflict. This concept is driven by acknowledgment that predicting every threat is unrealistic and promotes the idea that the best security approach is a flexible force capable of responding to a broad range of threats. The Army's Capstone Concept to support the Joint intent is development of a force that is not optimized towards specific threats but depends on rapid adaptability to threats as they are revealed. As envisioned, the Army's

concept demands debate on the risk and affordability implications of this approach to strategic balance. This paper addresses a risk-based approach to balance the Army that assesses alternative postures and addresses the viability of balanced force concepts in mitigating national risk in a resource constrained environment. This assessment also examines alternate definitions and definitional implications of balance and the continued relevance of conventional capabilities and nuclear deterrence to a balanced force posture

The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare Max G. Manwaring 2012-09-05

Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the

world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max G. Manwaring, it continues the arguments the author presented in *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime and Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries*. Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world. The insurgencies Manwaring describes span the globe. Beginning with conflicts in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s, he goes on to cover the Shining Path and its resurgence in Peru, Al Qaeda in Spain, popular militias in Cuba, Haiti, and Brazil, the Russian youth group

Nashi, and drugs and politics in Guatemala, as well as cyber warfare. Large, wealthy, well-armed nations such as the United States have learned from experience that these small wars and insurgencies do not resemble traditional wars fought between geographically distinct nation-state adversaries by easily identified military forces. Twenty-first-century irregular conflicts blur traditional distinctions among crime, terrorism, subversion, insurgency, militia, mercenary and gang activity, and warfare. Manwaring's multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with

politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.

The Evolution of Operational Art

John
Andreas Olsen 2011

Broadly defined as the grey area between strategy and tactics, operational art spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a given theatre of operations. An intermediate link between strategy and tactics has always existed, but a distinct concept that encompasses a systematic and

deliberate plan of campaign for major operations is a mere two hundred years old. Based on country specific case-studies, this book describes how the concepts that underpin operational art originated, how they received practical expression in various campaigns, and how they developed over time. The point of departure is the campaigns of 'the God of War', Napoleon Bonaparte. The book then proceeds with chapters on the evolution of operational art in Prussia / Germany, the Soviet Union / Russia, the United Kingdom, United States, Israel, and China. The final chapter deals with the future of operational art in irregular warfare. Theory is critical to refining and improving existing methods of applying operational warfare, and

its importance cannot be overstated; however, to be useful, theory and its accompanying vocabulary must be combined with a proper examination of historical trends and practical experience. The present volume attempts to achieve that combination. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy

Colin S. Gray 2006 The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular

foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."

War, Peace and International Relations

Colin S. Gray 2013-06-17

War, Peace and International Relations provides an introduction to the strategic history of the past two centuries, showing how those 200 years were shaped and reshaped extensively by war. The book takes a broad view of what was relevant to the causes, courses, and consequences of wars. Written by leading strategist Professor Colin Gray, the book provides students with a good grounding in the contribution of war to the development of the modern world, from the pre-industrial era to

the age of international terrorism and smart weapons. This second edition has been thoroughly revised and updated: It is the first one-volume strategic history textbook on the market; It covers all the major wars of the past two centuries; It is up to date and comprehensive, including a new section on the American Civil War, a new chapter on geography and strategy, and completely rewritten chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s and on irregular warfare. This textbook will be essential reading for students of strategic studies, security studies, war studies, international relations and international history.

Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth

Andrew Mumford

2015-02-16 This is a curated and

comprehensive collection of the most important works covering matters related to national security, diplomacy, defense, war, strategy, and tactics. The collection spans centuries of thought and experience, and includes the latest analysis of international threats, both conventional and asymmetric. It also includes riveting first person accounts of historic battles and wars. Some of the books in this Series are reproductions of historical works preserved by some of the leading libraries in the world. As with any reproduction of a historical artifact, some of these books contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. We believe these books are essential to this collection and the study of war, and have

therefore brought them back into print, despite these imperfections. We hope you enjoy the unmatched breadth and depth of this collection, from the historical to the just-published works.

Understanding Future Irregular Warfare Challenges

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities 2012 Nonstate Warfare Stephen Biddle 2022-07-26 How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption:

that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In *Nonstate Warfare*, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic

theory to explain any given nonstate actor's position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, *Nonstate Warfare* offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.

Crafting Strategy for

Irregular Warfare Thomas
a Marks 2020-08-04 The
2018 U.S. National
Defense Strategy made
headlines by officially
downgrading terrorism as
a national security
priority in favor of
"inter-state strategic
competition." Many
interpreted the
statement as signifying
a return to
"conventional combat,"
yet a closer reading
suggests that even
state-based competition
is likely to be
"irregular." Much like
insurgent adversaries,
states blend separate
instruments of power to
offset military
weakness, weaponize
narratives to ease
strategic progress, and
exploit social and
political contradictions
to undermine and divide
target societies. The
effort to understand
this approach has
generated new jargon-
"hybrid war," "the gray

zone"-yet the United
States and the West in
general struggle to
overcome their
entrenched presumptions
about war. Such
confusion constitutes an
upstream source of
analytical friction with
implications for how
strategy is conceived
and implemented. Based
on the pedagogical
approach of the College
of International
Security Affairs within
the National Defense
University, this article
presents an analytical
framework to assess and
respond to irregular
threats. Though
terminological precision
and analytical
frameworks are no
panacea for the malaise
facing Western strategy,
it is an indispensable
starting point for all
that must follow.

**United States and
Unconventional Warfare -
Al Qaeda's Exploitation
of American Weakness,**

Iran and Proxy Terrorism, Hizbollah, China's Holistic Asymmetric Warfare Plan, Future Adversaries

Department of Defense
2017-04-27 Given the success of terrorist organizations against the United States since 1983 it is prudent to ask if nations will pursue unconventional engagements with the United States. According to the National Defense Strategy, "U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages. For this reason, we must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat." What are the

implications for future National Defense Strategies? The United States of America is no stranger to unconventional warfare. The American Revolution was the United States' first experience in terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The National Defense Strategy of 2008 states that the conventional warfare dominance of the United States will remain unchecked for the foreseeable future. However, despite its ability to defeat a conventional enemy, the United States has shown an inability to effectively deal with an enemy, either nation-state or non-state actor, that employs terrorism and asymmetric warfare as a means to engage in combat. The United States' conventional dominance has been no deterrent to terrorism. While the

immediate adversaries in the Global War on Terrorism campaign are Al Qaeda and its allies, the reality exists that legitimate nation-states would resort to unconventional warfare operations in order to defeat the United States in a future conflict. Iran supports terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, Iran continues to develop nuclear technology. The United States must be prepared to face nations, like China, that have a far broader program for unconventional warfare that includes cyber, satellite, economic, diplomatic, and information warfare. The United States needs to adopt a new definition of full-spectrum operations. Previously, this phrase was equated to the combined arms concept used by the military. In order to

defeat an unconventional threat, full-spectrum operations must encompass all the instruments of national power and be able to meet the unconventional adversary at their level and, if possible, preempt their attack. It will require the United States to develop an unconventional strategy and the capability to employ that strategy. Through economics, diplomacy, information operations, propaganda, alliance building, military might, governmental subversion and fear, the United States can defeat an unconventional enemy.

Tc 7-100 Hybrid Threat November 2010

Headquarters Department of the Army 2017-10-09

Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare. These are

tactics which are part of Russian military doctrine and have been successfully used against Ukraine. Being so new and so successful, hybrid warfare is difficult to defeat. The US Army has begun training to counter hybrid threats and this manual provides doctrinal guidance on how an opposing force might exploit the hybrid threat model in use against US forces for training.

Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare

Richard H. Shultz
2009-09-01 Conflict in the 21st Century differs markedly from the way the United States thought about and prepared for war and defense during most of the 20th Century. Armed Groups remain key actors, having strategic impact at the local, state, regional, and even global level. As

these implications come into sharper focus, change is taking place in military doctrine and operations. To prepare tomorrow's warriors and their intelligence counterparts for these challenges, the professional military education program (PME) of the US Department of Defense also needs to adapt to the new strategic context. To assist in the development of this education, in 2005 the National Strategy Information Center initiated a project to develop curricula about the armed group phenomenon, and to prepare PME faculty to teach the subject in the nation's professional military schools, colleges, and universities. NSIC has been at the forefront of innovating and institutionalizing education on major

dimensions of security studies with military and civilian partners for more than 40 years. The new curriculum was developed in consultation with the leadership of America's top military schools, and was refined at two week-long seminars for military and civilian faculty. The authors, all experienced faculty, present the dimensions of the 21st century security environment, and describe the evolution of the curricula development. This groundbreaking syllabus on Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare is in five parts, each with defined learning objectives, substantive subject matter, and annotated references of the key literature. The 21st century global security environment and the key role of armed groups Types of armed groups; insurgents,

militias, terrorists, and organized crime Profiling armed groups and movements: A new approach to the order of battle Strategic, regional, and indirect threats from armed groups and opportunities Meeting the Challenge: the whole of government approach Full Spectrum Dominance Maria Ryan 2019-09-24 America's war on terror is widely defined by the Afghanistan and Iraq fronts. Yet, as this book demonstrates, both the international campaign and the new ways of fighting that grew out of it played out across multiple fronts beyond the Middle East. Maria Ryan explores how secondary fronts in the Philippines, sub-Saharan Africa, Georgia, and the Caspian Sea Basin became key test sites for developing what the Department of Defense

called "full spectrum dominance": mastery across the entire range of possible conflict, from conventional through irregular warfare. Full Spectrum Dominance is the first sustained historical examination of the secondary fronts in the war on terror. It explores whether irregular warfare has been effective in creating global stability or if new terrorist groups have emerged in response to the intervention. As the U.S. military, Department of Defense, White House, and State Department have increasingly turned to irregular capabilities and objectives, understanding the underlying causes as well as the effects of the quest for full spectrum dominance become ever more important. The

development of irregular strategies has left a deeply ambiguous and concerning global legacy.

The New

Counterinsurgency Era

David H. Ucko 2009-07-02

Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to "re-learn" counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD's institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything

from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire

new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.

The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare

Stephen Biddle 2008-09-28 The future of non-state military actors is a central issue for U.S. strategy and defense planning. It is widely believed that such combatants will be increasingly common opponents for the U.S. military, and many now advocate sweeping change in U.S. military posture to prepare for this the debate over the associated agenda for "low-tech" or irregular warfare transformation is quickly becoming one of the central issues for U.S. defense policy

and strategy. As a prominent recent example of a non-state actor fighting a Westernized state, Hezbollah's 2006 campaign thus offers a window into a kind of warfare that is increasingly central to the defense debate in the United States. And the case's implications for U.S. policy have already become highly controversial. Some see Hezbollah as an essentially terrorist organization using an information age version of the asymmetric military methods seen as typical of non-state actors historically. This view of Hezbollah as an information age guerrilla force strengthens the case for a major redesign of the U.S. military to reposition it for irregular warfare. Its advocates differ in the particulars, but most would expand the Army

and Marine Corps; reequip this larger ground force with lighter weapons and vehicles; restructure it to deemphasize traditional armor and artillery in favor of light infantry, civil affairs, military police, military advisor, and special forces capability; and reengineer training, doctrine, Service culture, recruitment, and promotion systems to stress low-intensity irregular warfare skills and methods rather than conventional combat. And major changes in the interagency process would be needed to replace a balkanized, slow-moving decision-making system with one agile and integrated enough to compete effectively with politically nimble, media savvy opponents in portraying the results of such warfare

persuasively to public audiences overseas. If so, the needed changes in the defense program would be extremely expensive. Many would pay for this by scaling back or abandoning hi-tech air and naval modernization programs; reducing the size of the Air Force and oceangoing Navy; and cutting back the ground forces' training and preparation for conventional war fighting. The result would be a very different American military and defense establishment—from its size to its structure, equipment, people, and doctrine. Others, however, see Hezbollah's 2006 campaign as a major departure from the asymmetric methods of traditional terrorists or guerrillas and as a shift toward the conventional military methods normally associated with state

actors. What is new in this account is how much the 2006 campaign differed from terrorist or guerrilla warfare information age or not—and how conventional and state-like the fighting was. This view of Hezbollah as a conventional army weakens the case for irregular warfare transformation. Instead it implies that a conventionally structured military is actually better suited for a future of non-state opponents than low-tech transformation advocates claim. Where capabilities for low intensity combat can be improved without undermining conventional performance this would always be wise, but many in this camp see sharp tradeoffs between the forces and training needed for irregular as opposed to conventional combat; if so, then

radical transformation would be ill advised and traditional force structures, doctrines, and training are a better course for the future.

Gangs, Pseudo-

Militaries, and Other

Modern Mercenaries Max

G. Manwaring 2012-10-11

As the first decade of the twenty-first century has made brutally clear, the very definitions of war and the enemy have changed almost beyond recognition. Threats to security are now as likely to come from armed propagandists, popular militias, or mercenary organizations as they are from conventional armies backed by nation-states. In this timely book, national security expert Max G. Manwaring explores a little-understood actor on the stage of irregular warfare—the gang. Since the end of the Cold War,

some one hundred insurgencies or irregular wars have erupted throughout the world. Gangs have figured prominently in more than half of those conflicts, yet these and other nonstate actors have received little focused attention from scholars or analysts. This book fills that void. Employing a case study approach, and believing that shadows from the past often portend the future, Manwaring begins with a careful consideration of the writings of V. I. Lenin. He then scrutinizes the Piqueteros in Argentina, gangs in Colombia, private armies in Mexico, Hugo Chavez's use of popular militias in Venezuela, and the looming threat of Al Qaeda in Western Europe. As conventional warfare is increasingly eclipsed by these irregular and

“uncomfortable” wars, Manwaring boldly diagnoses the problem and recommends solutions that policymakers should heed.

Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran and the Rise of Irregular Warfare Seth G. Jones
2021-09-07 How three key figures in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran built ruthless irregular warfare campaigns that are eroding American power. In *Three Dangerous Men*, defense expert Seth Jones argues that the US is woefully unprepared for the future of global competition. While America has focused on building fighter jets, missiles, and conventional warfighting capabilities, its three principal rivals—Russia, Iran, and China—have increasingly adopted irregular warfare: cyber attacks, the use of proxy forces,

propaganda, espionage, and disinformation to undermine American power. Jones profiles three pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran who adapted American techniques and made huge gains without waging traditional warfare: Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov; the deceased Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani; and vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. Each has spent his career studying American power and devised techniques to avoid a conventional or nuclear war with the US. Gerasimov helped oversee a resurgence of Russian irregular warfare, which included attempts to undermine the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections and the SolarWinds cyber attack. Soleimani was so

effective in expanding Iranian power in the Middle East that Washington targeted him for assassination. Zhang Youxia presents the most alarming challenge because China has more power and potential at its disposal. Drawing on interviews with dozens of US military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials, as well as hundreds of documents translated from Russian, Farsi, and Mandarin, Jones shows how America's rivals have bloodied its reputation and seized territory worldwide. Instead of standing up to autocratic regimes, Jones demonstrates that the United States has largely abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence, and economic and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War. In a powerful conclusion,

Jones details the key steps the United States must take to alter how it thinks about—and engages in—competition before it is too late. **The New Legions** Major General Edward B. Atkeson 2011-11-23 In an era of extensive foreign commitments and seemingly perpetual irregular warfare, America's traditional national security model no longer works. Our forces are exhausted, our small wars stalemated, and our defense budget under inexorable downward pressure. In *The New Legions*, Major General (Ret.) Edward B. Atkeson reviews the political and military strategies that brought us to this point and proposes an innovative solution: shifting the military burden from U.S. soldiers and Marines to friendly indigenous fighters recruited,

trained, and equipped for operation in their native environments. Looking back through history as far as the Roman Empire, Atkeson finds ample precedent for the effectiveness of similar legions of fighters. He lays out how such a program would work and shows how these legions could help the United States achieve its global objectives in six troublesome regions from South America to Southeast Asia in a more cost-effective way. The New Legions will be of interest to policy makers, military strategists, and all citizens seeking a more effective military strategy.

Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Turkey

Spyridon Plakoudas
2018-04-04 This book seeks to answer the "why" and "how" questions about the insurgency of the PKK, a

militant left-wing group of Turkey's Kurds, in Turkey. The PKK has been inter-locked in an intermittent war against Turkey since 1984 in the name of Kurdish nationalism. The author combines insights of Strategy and IR - from strategy and tactics in irregular warfare to peace negotiations between state authorities and insurgents, with data from qualitative research, to achieve two inter-related objectives: first, assess the current state of affairs and predict the future course of the conflict and, secondly, draw general conclusions on how protracted conflicts can end and how.

Irregular Warfare the Future Military Strategy for Small States Sándor Fabian 2015-02-17 A thought provoking essay on the possible

implications of irregular warfare in national military strategy.

National Security

Dilemmas Colin S. Gray
2009 A contemporary primer on the leading arguments about U.S. national security, *National Security Dilemmas* addresses the major challenges and opportunities that are live-issue areas for American policymakers and strategists today. Colin S. Gray provides an in-depth analysis of a policy and strategy for deterrence; the long-term U.S. bid to transform its armed forces' capabilities, with particular reference to strategic surprise, in the face of many great uncertainties; the difficulty of understanding and exploiting the challenge of revolutionary change in warfare; the problems

posed by enemies who fight using irregular methods; and the awesome dilemmas for U.S. policy over the options to wage preventive and preemptive warfare. With forty years' experience as a strategist, within and outside of government, Gray uses a problem-solving motif throughout the book, suggesting solutions to the challenges he identifies. The book's master narrative is that the United States must take a more considered strategic approach to its security dilemmas. Too often, the country's leaders decide on a policy and then move to take action, all the while neglecting to devise a plan that would connect its political purposes to military means. While many of Gray's judgments here are critical of current ideas and behavior, he crafted them as helpful

guides should planners adopt them when revising policies and approaches. Strategy is a practical matter; truly it is the zone wherein theory meets practice. This text can be used as an expert guide to the major national security challenges of today. It both explains the structure of these challenges and provides useful answers. With a foreword by Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), Bren Chair, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia.

Terrorism and the New Age of Irregular Warfare United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities 2010 "Making Riflemen from Mud" James D. Campbell 2007 Prior to World War II, the Army had a deeply ingrained

facility with and acceptance of what we now term unconventional warfare -- raising, training, advising and cooperating with tribal militias, local paramilitaries, and other non-state armed groups. This culture of irregular warfare was attributable to nearly 300 years of American military tradition from the colonial period until 1941, including extensive experience in cooperating with Native American tribes and individual scouts during the expansion of the western frontier. These traditions of unconventional war reached maturity in the years of fighting on the western plains after the Civil War, and were given ultimate expression in the creation of the Philippine Scouts at the beginning of the 20th century. Since World War

II, the wider military has lost this expertise in and comfortable familiarity with unconventional operations, with the Special Operations community taking on the sole proprietorship of this role. Given the variety of political environments in which today's conventional soldiers may find themselves, and the current nature of conflicts ongoing and likely to occur in the world, the Army culture as a whole can and must readapt itself to the new old realities of irregular war.

Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies Walt L. Perry 2008

"Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. It is

likely that U.S. forces will face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies that are unwilling to engage in conventional combat with U.S. forces. This monograph examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies. The authors examine the stages of an insurgency and discuss the kinds of intelligence that are needed at each stage. A number of techniques -- pattern discernment and predictive analysis, for example -- appear to show promise of being useful to intelligence analysis. The authors also explore two closely connected methods in depth to examine the interactions between friendly and enemy

forces: game theory and change detection." -- p.
[4] of cover.